Scheduled rotation (Issue #38). New secret generated, re-encrypted with
the scoped rotation age key, checksum/rotated-at annotations bumped so
Flux restarts coturn + synapse-main on merge. Please review and merge.
Closes issue #38's automation half (architecture fix + first rotation
already landed in earlier commits this session). Monthly CronJob
(rohana.axion1337.de/sorb/axion-secret-rotation:v1 - alpine + git/sops/
jq/age) that:
- generates a new secret
- re-encrypts coturn-secret.yaml and synapse-turn-secret.yaml using the
scoped rotation-only age key (added as an additional recipient in an
earlier commit) - never touches the repo's master sops-age key
- bumps the turn-secret-checksum (HelmRelease annotation) and rotated-at
(coturn Deployment annotation) so merging actually restarts both
consumers, reusing the existing checksum-annotation pattern already in
this repo rather than inventing a new mechanism
- opens a Pull Request rather than pushing straight to main - a human
reviews and merges, keeping a checkpoint before production picks up new
credentials while still automating the tedious coordination work
Needs a Gitea PAT (repo write scope) filled into
turn-secret-rotation-secret.yaml's gitea-token key before first use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Issue #38 discussion surfaced a real bug: the TURN shared secret was
duplicated - correctly SOPS-encrypted in coturn-secret.yaml, but also
hardcoded in plaintext in synapse-values.yaml (a plain, non-SOPS
ConfigMap), visible in git history. Also found turn_user_lifetime is
86400000ms (24h), not "short-lived" as previously assumed - raising the
stakes of the leak somewhat.
Extracted the turn config block into its own dedicated SOPS-encrypted
Secret (synapse-turn-secret.yaml), wired via a second HelmRelease
valuesFrom entry (same pattern already used for ess-mas-values-secret).
Rotated the value while doing this, so the leaked plaintext secret is no
longer live anywhere.
Added checksum/rotated-at annotations (matrix-stack HelmRelease's
existing element-config-checksum patch gets a sibling turn-secret-checksum;
coturn's Deployment pod template gets a rotated-at annotation) so future
rotations actually restart both consumers - Kubernetes doesn't restart
running pods when a referenced Secret's content changes on its own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes issues #6 and #15 (treated jointly, per combined analysis in their
comments). Two CronJobs, one per namespace, each pushing to its own Borg
repo on the newly booked Storage Box (u641795.your-storagebox.de:23, BX11
1TB) with its own repo passphrase - a leaked passphrase for one doesn't
expose the other:
- matrix: synapse-backup dumps the synapse + matrixauthenticationservice
DBs (shared postgres, existing chart-generated POSTGRES_ADMIN_PASSWORD)
and the Synapse media_store PVC (read-only mount)
- authentik: authentik-backup dumps the authentik DB (existing
authentik-credentials pg-password)
Custom image (rohana.axion1337.de/sorb/axion-backup:v1, postgres:17-alpine
+ borgbackup + openssh-client - matches the live Postgres major version
exactly, unlike Alpine's stock postgresql16-client) pushed as a public
package, same pattern as the existing threadnet-web image (no
imagePullSecret needed).
SSH host key pinned via known_hosts ConfigMap (captured via ssh-keyscan
ahead of time) rather than trusting on first connect in an unattended job.
Retention: 7 daily / 4 weekly / 6 monthly via borg prune. Schedule: 03:00
and 03:15, offset to avoid resource contention.
NetworkPolicy: added each backup job's pod as an allowed source to its
namespace's existing postgres ingress rule (matrix's allow-ingress-postgres,
authentik's allow-ingress-authentik-postgresql from #37). Egress already
unrestricted in both namespaces, so no change needed for the outbound SSH
connection to the Storage Box.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Almost every tracked file in the repo had drifted to mode 777 on disk
(only files created fresh this session were unaffected), and a chunk of
that drift had already been committed as spurious +x bits on plain
YAML/Markdown files (authentik.yaml, kustomization.yaml, coturn.yaml,
element-server-suite.yaml, TASKS.md, install.md, etc.) - none of these
need to be executable. Restored to 644 for regular files, 755 only for
actual scripts (postCreateCommand.sh, docker-init.sh, install-hooks.sh,
pre-commit hook, element-setup-linux.sh).
Also found element-setup-macos.command was missing +x despite having a
shebang and being meant for double-click execution on macOS - fixed.
Added .gitignore for .DS_Store and .claude/ and stopped tracking the five
.DS_Store files that had been committed by accident.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ingress-only default-deny plus per-component allow rules, using named
container ports throughout (not Service ports) after the authentik
port-mismatch incident. Traefik -> element-web/element-admin/haproxy
(fronts both matrix.axion1337.chat and well-known)/MAS; synapse <-
haproxy+MAS; postgres <- synapse+MAS; RTC signalling via Traefik, RTC
media NodePorts left open to the internet by design; monitoring scrape
allows for synapse/postgres/rtc-sfu metrics; ACME solver allow. coturn
(hostNetwork) needs nothing - NetworkPolicy doesn't apply to it. Part
of issue #10.
- Reduce HelmRelease interval from 1h to 5m for faster sync
- Add checksum annotation to trigger reconciliation when element-values.yaml changes
- This ensures Flux CD re-deploys the chart when themes/config updates are made
To update the checksum after editing element-values.yaml:
md5sum apps/production/custom-configs/element-values.yaml
# Update the value in apps/production/kustomization.yaml patches[0].patch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add coturn Deployment with hostNetwork mode and init container for secret substitution. Include SOPS-encrypted shared secret, TLS certificate for turn.axion1337.chat, and Synapse TURN configuration with proper relay URIs and credentials.
Resolves DTLS timeout issues in RTC video calls by providing media relay for clients behind NAT/Firewall.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>