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18 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 2932ffffc3 fix(matrix-stack): shorten HelmRelease reconcile interval to 1m
Live-tested Issue #38's rotation: after merging the automated rotation
PR, coturn restarted quickly (Kustomization-level, 1m interval), but
synapse-main lagged behind since it depends on this separate HelmRelease
with its own 5m interval - a real (self-healing, but avoidable) window
where coturn had the new TURN secret and Synapse still had the old one,
which would reject each other's credentials/relayed media. Matching the
interval to production-apps's 1m tightens that window without needing
any new automation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore Cimbal 0f7ff1a896 Merge pull request 'chore(coturn): automated TURN shared-secret rotation' (#42) from turn-secret-rotation-20260728-192656 into main 2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 debf980d5f fix(turn-rotation): add hostAliases for private-network Gitea access
Job hung indefinitely on git clone - public-internet reachability to
rohana.axion1337.de from inside pods is currently down (related to
Issue #41's firewall/private-network findings), and the node-level
/etc/hosts workaround only helps containerd's image pulls, not processes
running inside pods (they resolve via CoreDNS + their own /etc/hosts, not
the node's). hostAliases routes this job's git/API traffic over the
private Hetzner network directly - verified working with a real pod.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
turn-secret-rotation 802e09cd9c chore(coturn): automated TURN shared-secret rotation
Scheduled rotation (Issue #38). New secret generated, re-encrypted with
the scoped rotation age key, checksum/rotated-at annotations bumped so
Flux restarts coturn + synapse-main on merge. Please review and merge.
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore Cimbal d742c99ba5 chore: set Gitea PAT for TURN secret rotation job 2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 ac7e65100d feat(coturn): add automated TURN shared-secret rotation CronJob
Closes issue #38's automation half (architecture fix + first rotation
already landed in earlier commits this session). Monthly CronJob
(rohana.axion1337.de/sorb/axion-secret-rotation:v1 - alpine + git/sops/
jq/age) that:

- generates a new secret
- re-encrypts coturn-secret.yaml and synapse-turn-secret.yaml using the
  scoped rotation-only age key (added as an additional recipient in an
  earlier commit) - never touches the repo's master sops-age key
- bumps the turn-secret-checksum (HelmRelease annotation) and rotated-at
  (coturn Deployment annotation) so merging actually restarts both
  consumers, reusing the existing checksum-annotation pattern already in
  this repo rather than inventing a new mechanism
- opens a Pull Request rather than pushing straight to main - a human
  reviews and merges, keeping a checkpoint before production picks up new
  credentials while still automating the tedious coordination work

Needs a Gitea PAT (repo write scope) filled into
turn-secret-rotation-secret.yaml's gitea-token key before first use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 be95bd921c feat(coturn): add scoped age recipient for automated rotation job
Adds a second age recipient (dedicated keypair, private key never touches
the repo) to just these two files, so the upcoming rotation CronJob can
decrypt/re-encrypt them without needing the repo's master sops-age key,
which can decrypt every secret in the repo. Verified: master key still
decrypts both files; the new scoped key can decrypt both files but
correctly cannot decrypt an unrelated secret (authentik-secret.yaml).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore Cimbal 7795f89fc9 docs(coturn): note the one-time manual rollingUpdate fix instead of an ineffective YAML null 2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 9fa947cc21 fix(coturn): explicitly null rollingUpdate field alongside Recreate strategy
Server-side apply left the old RollingUpdate defaults (maxSurge/maxUnavailable)
on the live object from before strategy.type was ever set explicitly, which
the API rejects when combined with type: Recreate. Explicit null clears it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 233b13f972 fix(coturn): use Recreate deployment strategy for hostNetwork pod
Discovered live: the default RollingUpdate strategy tries to schedule the
new pod before removing the old one, which can never succeed for a
hostNetwork Deployment on a single-node cluster (both pods would need the
same node ports 3478/5349 simultaneously). Surfaced by the rotated-at
annotation bump from the previous commit getting stuck in
FailedScheduling. Recreate kills the old pod first, freeing the ports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 51ea51352b fix(coturn): remove plaintext TURN shared secret, rotate leaked value
Issue #38 discussion surfaced a real bug: the TURN shared secret was
duplicated - correctly SOPS-encrypted in coturn-secret.yaml, but also
hardcoded in plaintext in synapse-values.yaml (a plain, non-SOPS
ConfigMap), visible in git history. Also found turn_user_lifetime is
86400000ms (24h), not "short-lived" as previously assumed - raising the
stakes of the leak somewhat.

Extracted the turn config block into its own dedicated SOPS-encrypted
Secret (synapse-turn-secret.yaml), wired via a second HelmRelease
valuesFrom entry (same pattern already used for ess-mas-values-secret).
Rotated the value while doing this, so the leaked plaintext secret is no
longer live anywhere.

Added checksum/rotated-at annotations (matrix-stack HelmRelease's
existing element-config-checksum patch gets a sibling turn-secret-checksum;
coturn's Deployment pod template gets a rotated-at annotation) so future
rotations actually restart both consumers - Kubernetes doesn't restart
running pods when a referenced Secret's content changes on its own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore Cimbal 9607687e4e docs: document node-level /etc/hosts entry for private-network registry access 2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 49005ed325 fix(backup): retry pg_dump connection to survive NetworkPolicy sync lag
Live testing showed pg_dump got "Connection refused" immediately at job
start, but a manual pg_isready/psql from an identically-labeled pod a few
seconds later succeeded fine every time. The cluster's NetworkPolicy
controller needs a brief moment to program a brand-new pod's IP into the
target's allowed ingress rules; a job that starts dumping instantly can
race that window. backup.sh now waits for pg_isready before each pg_dump
(up to 15 tries / ~30s) instead of assuming connectivity is ready at
container start.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 ba270bce71 feat(backup): add nightly Borg backups to Hetzner Storage Box
Closes issues #6 and #15 (treated jointly, per combined analysis in their
comments). Two CronJobs, one per namespace, each pushing to its own Borg
repo on the newly booked Storage Box (u641795.your-storagebox.de:23, BX11
1TB) with its own repo passphrase - a leaked passphrase for one doesn't
expose the other:

- matrix: synapse-backup dumps the synapse + matrixauthenticationservice
  DBs (shared postgres, existing chart-generated POSTGRES_ADMIN_PASSWORD)
  and the Synapse media_store PVC (read-only mount)
- authentik: authentik-backup dumps the authentik DB (existing
  authentik-credentials pg-password)

Custom image (rohana.axion1337.de/sorb/axion-backup:v1, postgres:17-alpine
+ borgbackup + openssh-client - matches the live Postgres major version
exactly, unlike Alpine's stock postgresql16-client) pushed as a public
package, same pattern as the existing threadnet-web image (no
imagePullSecret needed).

SSH host key pinned via known_hosts ConfigMap (captured via ssh-keyscan
ahead of time) rather than trusting on first connect in an unattended job.
Retention: 7 daily / 4 weekly / 6 monthly via borg prune. Schedule: 03:00
and 03:15, offset to avoid resource contention.

NetworkPolicy: added each backup job's pod as an allowed source to its
namespace's existing postgres ingress rule (matrix's allow-ingress-postgres,
authentik's allow-ingress-authentik-postgresql from #37). Egress already
unrestricted in both namespaces, so no change needed for the outbound SSH
connection to the Storage Box.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 2c5f77686d fix(authentik): scope authentik-postgresql NetworkPolicy to internal access
Closes issue #37. The Bitnami postgresql subchart's auto-generated
NetworkPolicy restricted the port (5432) but not the source - any pod in
any namespace could reach it, since additive NetworkPolicy rules can't
restrict an existing permissive one, only the chart itself controls it
(hence not touched during the original #10 rollout).

Disabled via postgresql.primary.networkPolicy.enabled: false and replaced
with a scoped policy allowing only authentik-server and authentik-worker
(same namespace) on 5432, matching the pattern already used for the
matrix namespace's postgres access. No metrics exporter is enabled for
this instance, so no monitoring-namespace rule is needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 414ada956a feat(authentik): capture MAS OIDC Provider/Application as a Blueprint
Closes issue #36. The OAuth2 Provider ("Matrix Authentication Service")
and its Application ("matrix" slug) linking Authentik to MAS were
originally clicked together by hand in the UI and existed nowhere as
code - unlike the flow fixes already captured in authentik-blueprints.yaml.
Losing the Authentik DB would have meant re-creating this from scratch,
including a fresh client_secret that MAS would no longer match.

The client_secret is read via !Env from AUTHENTIK_MAS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET,
sourced from a new key in the existing SOPS-encrypted authentik-credentials
Secret, rather than inlined into the blueprint ConfigMap (which isn't
itself encrypted). Value used is the actual live secret already in use,
read directly from the running Authentik DB - not a new/rotated one, so
this changes nothing about the current MAS<->Authentik pairing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 4a3d7c70a6 fix: restore correct file permissions, stop tracking .DS_Store
Almost every tracked file in the repo had drifted to mode 777 on disk
(only files created fresh this session were unaffected), and a chunk of
that drift had already been committed as spurious +x bits on plain
YAML/Markdown files (authentik.yaml, kustomization.yaml, coturn.yaml,
element-server-suite.yaml, TASKS.md, install.md, etc.) - none of these
need to be executable. Restored to 644 for regular files, 755 only for
actual scripts (postCreateCommand.sh, docker-init.sh, install-hooks.sh,
pre-commit hook, element-setup-linux.sh).

Also found element-setup-macos.command was missing +x despite having a
shebang and being meant for double-click execution on macOS - fixed.

Added .gitignore for .DS_Store and .claude/ and stopped tracking the five
.DS_Store files that had been committed by accident.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
Thore CimbalandClaude Sonnet 5 6973a8dbc7 fix(devcontainer): repair broken build and add docker socket permission fix
The devcontainer could never actually be built successfully - verified by
building it from scratch for the first time in a while. Found and fixed six
issues:

- kubectl: apt.kubernetes.io was deprecated/shut down by Google in 2023,
  switched to the official successor repo pkgs.k8s.io
- docker-ce-cli: apt line hardcoded arch=amd64, breaking the build on
  Apple Silicon; resolved dynamically via dpkg --print-architecture
- useradd -G docker failed because only the Docker CLI (no daemon) is
  installed, so no package ever creates the docker group; added explicit
  groupadd
- oh-my-zsh install had a nested-quoting bug that made the RUN step fail;
  simplified to download-then-run instead of one nested `su -c "sh -c ..."`
- sops binary was hardcoded to linux.amd64, only working on arm64 by luck
  via Docker Desktop's QEMU emulation; resolved dynamically like docker-ce
- docker.sock was mounted but unusable (permission denied) since the
  container's docker group GID never matched the host socket's GID; added
  a root entrypoint (docker-init.sh) that reconciles this at container
  start, then drops to the vscode user via gosu

Also fixed two stale mas-secrets.sops.yaml references (actual filename is
mas-secret.yaml) in README.md and postCreateCommand.sh, set the vscode
user's default shell to zsh (oh-my-zsh was installed but never used by
default), and documented all of the above plus a build+run verification
snippet in README.md so this class of drift is caught before it goes
unnoticed again.

Verified end-to-end: cold `docker build --no-cache`, then a real container
run against the actual mounted kubeconfig, age key, and docker socket -
kubectl reaches the live cluster, sops decrypts a real secret, and docker
ps talks to the real daemon as the vscode user.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 12:00:00 +00:00
35 changed files with 644 additions and 45 deletions
Vendored
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@@ -16,11 +16,14 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
zsh \
sudo \
openssh-client \
gosu \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Install kubectl
RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/kubernetes-archive-keyring.gpg https://packages.cloud.google.com/apt/doc/apt-key.gpg && \
echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/kubernetes-archive-keyring.gpg] https://apt.kubernetes.io/ kubernetes-xenial main" | tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/kubernetes.list && \
# Install kubectl (apt.kubernetes.io was deprecated/shut down by Google in 2023;
# pkgs.k8s.io is the current community-owned repo, versioned per k8s minor release)
RUN mkdir -p /etc/apt/keyrings && \
curl -fsSL https://pkgs.k8s.io/core:/stable:/v1.34/deb/Release.key | gpg --dearmor -o /etc/apt/keyrings/kubernetes-apt-keyring.gpg && \
echo "deb [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/kubernetes-apt-keyring.gpg] https://pkgs.k8s.io/core:/stable:/v1.34/deb/ /" | tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/kubernetes.list && \
apt-get update && apt-get install -y kubectl && \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
@@ -30,9 +33,10 @@ RUN curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/helm/helm/main/scripts/get-helm-3 | b
# Install Flux CLI
RUN curl -s https://fluxcd.io/install.sh | bash
# Install sops
RUN SOPS_VERSION=$(curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/getsops/sops/releases/latest | grep tag_name | cut -d '"' -f 4) && \
curl -sL -o /usr/local/bin/sops https://github.com/getsops/sops/releases/download/${SOPS_VERSION}/sops-${SOPS_VERSION}.linux.amd64 && \
# Install sops (arch resolved at build time, same reasoning as the Docker CLI step below)
RUN SOPS_ARCH=$(dpkg --print-architecture) && \
SOPS_VERSION=$(curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/getsops/sops/releases/latest | grep tag_name | cut -d '"' -f 4) && \
curl -sL -o /usr/local/bin/sops https://github.com/getsops/sops/releases/download/${SOPS_VERSION}/sops-${SOPS_VERSION}.linux.${SOPS_ARCH} && \
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/sops
# Install age
@@ -40,17 +44,31 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y age && \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Install Docker CLI (for interacting with Docker daemon)
# arch is resolved at build time so this works on both amd64 (cloud/CI) and arm64 (Apple Silicon) hosts
RUN curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/debian/gpg | gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/docker-archive-keyring.gpg && \
echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/docker-archive-keyring.gpg] https://download.docker.com/linux/debian $(lsb_release -cs) stable" | tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list > /dev/null && \
echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/docker-archive-keyring.gpg] https://download.docker.com/linux/debian $(lsb_release -cs) stable" | tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list > /dev/null && \
apt-get update && apt-get install -y docker-ce-cli && \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Create a non-root user 'vscode' for development
RUN useradd -m -s /bin/bash -G docker vscode && \
# groupadd is needed because only the Docker CLI (not the daemon) is installed above,
# so the 'docker' group is never created as a package side effect
RUN groupadd docker && \
useradd -m -s /bin/zsh -G docker vscode && \
echo "vscode ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL" >> /etc/sudoers.d/vscode
# Install oh-my-zsh for better shell experience
RUN su - vscode -c "sh -c '$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ohmyzsh/ohmyzsh/master/tools/install.sh)' '' --unattended"
RUN curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ohmyzsh/ohmyzsh/master/tools/install.sh -o /tmp/install-omz.sh && \
su - vscode -c "sh /tmp/install-omz.sh --unattended" && \
rm /tmp/install-omz.sh
# Entrypoint runs as root to reconcile the docker group's GID against the mounted
# socket (see docker-init.sh), then drops to 'vscode' for the actual session/command.
# Stays root-owned at the PID 1 level; VS Code's own `docker exec -u vscode` sessions
# and the entrypoint's `gosu vscode` both end up correctly grouped either way.
COPY docker-init.sh /usr/local/bin/docker-init.sh
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-init.sh
USER vscode
WORKDIR /workspace
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-init.sh"]
CMD ["/bin/zsh"]
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@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Der Container mounted `~/.age` automatisch. Setze die Umgebungsvariable:
```bash
# Im Container-Terminal (SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE ist bereits automatisch gesetzt!)
# Jetzt kannst du Secrets bearbeiten (wird transparent ver-/entschlüsselt):
sops apps/production/custom-configs/mas-secrets.sops.yaml
sops apps/production/custom-configs/mas-secret.yaml
```
### Schritt 3: VSCode Integration (optional)
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ kubectl get pods -n matrix
flux get helmreleases -A
# Secrets bearbeiten (mit verschlüsselung)
sops apps/production/custom-configs/mas-secrets.sops.yaml
sops apps/production/custom-configs/mas-secret.yaml
# FluxCD Sync erzwingen
flux reconcile kustomization production-apps --with-source
@@ -193,6 +193,44 @@ Siehe `README.md` → **Issue 3**. Kurz:
- `wellKnownDelegation: enabled: false` setzen
- Oder `.well-known/matrix/server` manuell auf `elementWeb` weiterleiten
## ⚠️ Wartungshinweis: Warum dieser Container regelmäßig getestet werden muss
Der Dockerfile installiert mehrere Tools über externe apt-Repos und Install-Skripte
(`pkgs.k8s.io`, `download.docker.com`, GitHub-Releases, `fluxcd.io`/`ohmyzsh.sh`
Installer). **Diese Quellen sind nicht unter unserer Kontrolle und können jederzeit
brechen** — genau das ist am 2026-07-28 passiert: der Container konnte seit
Fertigstellung nie erfolgreich gebaut werden, ohne dass es jemand bemerkt hat, weil
niemand ihn zwischenzeitlich tatsächlich gebaut hat. Gefundene und behobene Probleme:
| # | Problem | Ursache | Fix |
|---|---------|---------|-----|
| 1 | `apt.kubernetes.io` → `404 Not Found` | Google hat das alte Kubernetes-apt-Repo 2023 abgeschaltet | Umgestellt auf das offizielle Nachfolge-Repo `pkgs.k8s.io` (versioniert pro k8s-Minor-Version, aktuell `v1.34`) |
| 2 | `docker-ce-cli` "has no installation candidate" auf Apple Silicon | Repo-Zeile hatte `arch=amd64` hartkodiert, Build lief aber auf arm64 | `arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture)` zur Build-Zeit ermitteln |
| 3 | `useradd: group 'docker' does not exist` | Nur die Docker-**CLI** wird installiert (kein Daemon), daher legt kein Paket die `docker`-Gruppe automatisch an | `groupadd docker` explizit vor `useradd` |
| 4 | oh-my-zsh-Install schlägt mit Quoting-Fehler fehl | Verschachtelte `sh -c '...'`-Anführungszeichen in einer Zeile | Install-Skript erst in eine Datei laden, dann sauber mit `su - vscode -c "sh /tmp/install-omz.sh --unattended"` ausführen |
| 5 | `sops`-Binary war hart auf `linux.amd64` gepinnt | Lief auf Apple Silicon nur zufällig per QEMU-Emulation von Docker Desktop mit, nicht nativ | Arch dynamisch über `dpkg --print-architecture` auflösen (`linux.arm64` / `linux.amd64`) |
| 6 | `docker.sock`-Zugriff im Container: `permission denied` | Der gemountete Host-Socket gehört (je nach Docker-Setup) einer Gruppe/GID, die im Container nicht existiert oder nicht der `docker`-Gruppe entspricht (auf Docker Desktop für Mac/Windows z.B. GID 0/root statt einer eigenen `docker`-Gruppe) | `docker-init.sh`: Root-Entrypoint gleicht beim Container-Start die GID der `docker`-Gruppe an den tatsächlich gemounteten Socket an (bzw. tritt der GID-Inhaber-Gruppe bei, falls die GID schon vergeben ist), wechselt danach per `gosu` zu `vscode` |
**Konsequenz für die Zukunft:** Vor jeder größeren Änderung an `.devcontainer/` (oder
mindestens vierteljährlich) einmal real bauen und laufen lassen:
```bash
docker build -f .devcontainer/Dockerfile -t ess-gitops-devcontainer-test .devcontainer
docker run --rm \
-v ~/.kube:/home/vscode/.kube \
-v ~/.age:/home/vscode/.age \
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
ess-gitops-devcontainer-test bash -c '
kubectl version --client && helm version --short && flux --version && \
sops --version && age --version && docker version --format "{{.Server.Version}}" && \
id vscode
'
```
Wenn `docker version` hier den echten Server, nicht nur die Client-Version zeigt, und
`id vscode` die passende Docker-Gruppe/GID auflistet, funktioniert der Socket-Zugriff
tatsächlich — nicht nur der Build.
## 📚 Weitere Ressourcen
- [Dev Containers Docs](https://containers.dev)
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Runs as root at container start (before any `docker exec -u vscode` from VS Code).
# The docker.sock's GID is only known once the host socket is actually bind-mounted,
# so it can't be baked in at image build time - it must be reconciled here, at runtime.
set -e
if [ -S /var/run/docker.sock ]; then
SOCK_GID=$(stat -c '%g' /var/run/docker.sock)
CURRENT_GID=$(getent group docker | cut -d: -f3)
if [ -n "$SOCK_GID" ] && [ "$SOCK_GID" != "$CURRENT_GID" ]; then
EXISTING_GROUP=$(getent group "$SOCK_GID" | cut -d: -f1)
if [ -n "$EXISTING_GROUP" ]; then
# GID is already taken by another group (e.g. GID 0/root - Docker Desktop for
# Mac/Windows owns the socket this way inside its VM), so join that group
# instead of trying to reassign it to 'docker'.
usermod -aG "$EXISTING_GROUP" vscode
else
groupmod -g "$SOCK_GID" docker
fi
fi
fi
exec gosu vscode "$@"
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@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ echo ""
echo "📚 Useful commands:"
echo " - kubectl get pods -n matrix (check pod status)"
echo " - flux get helmreleases -A (check helm releases)"
echo " - sops apps/production/custom-configs/mas-secrets.sops.yaml (edit secrets)"
echo " - sops apps/production/custom-configs/mas-secret.yaml (edit secrets)"
echo ""
echo "🔗 For kubeconfig setup:"
echo " - Copy your ~/.kube/config to access the cluster"
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
.DS_Store
.claude/
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: authentik-backup-credentials
namespace: authentik
stringData:
borg-passphrase: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:5PApz4TqSNN2vVXeFSuomd051nl+cYk+a+STViwddG/Hj7XWQ099vvTlKSE=,iv:MFG04/66YqtOjZWsLpy236MYwR05z91ngOQ0BmLNxzA=,tag:gxD5prW8Ted3Q2ZY3sYSYQ==,type:str]
ssh-private-key: ENC[AES256_GCM,data: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,iv:yFNKkdegLLq8jq1Ya6v67urSJTdG3Ge4ZbmKizqQhmk=,tag:6l/qMb1d1oD8sfVEebW6gQ==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBWMllTL2hRcEhCT2MxcWZy
dkxndmlZRW5FZ2NiWWdFckxqYTFKS1B6SXlvCjJySXRsZThvczNnWjlyM0N2Snha
eitvWUhhdmU4U0V3OG55WjdLbU9KcUEKLS0tIEM3MStzNUJhaGg4M0hKMVF1bnBB
RWVqVDRBNmJ0b1Bwd0l3dWxPT3Q0SU0KOEoyejkH4RC0p8ka3FjI7MyzRJg+uu7h
j3wf1q+Hgg73djDBSPYJkrB6Bdl4YMwo8SzbtW8O9elDE0qAioR0bQ==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age14l0hwfqylwpemz5y2ghh2yxk0phszlnj3qlejhue0fw0kz3tmfgqdsjzdh
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-07-28T18:20:58Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:lwwNbxSxtgDTDmaWMU1uf7TBOEw8gFBFKb982VIsGMeM0fIPHvX12Qts90MNgYIJliOWgAWrwyvAgfXWKuE37RNo+BtyfHCWi4IESKSN/RJrd/yMpRKx+02rifH3nl26ZCAQT1Pa0fjI1SfMhbVzfnD9a/AMARXZMhLRc0OqczY=,iv:SgP2iMtENRtZfw6I9EaOsmvecFNYCIZWqVj+cZ+T7EI=,tag:s4oEyxqyUx6ibqsk4g9xpw==,type:str]
version: 3.13.3
+85
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
# Nightly Borg backup of the authentik Postgres database to a Hetzner Storage Box
# (issues #6 + #15). See apps/authentik/authentik-backup-secret.yaml for the SSH key +
# Borg repo passphrase, and apps/production/synapse-backup.yaml for the matrix-side job
# (same Storage Box, separate repo/passphrase, offset schedule).
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: authentik-backup-known-hosts
namespace: authentik
data:
known_hosts: |
[u641795.your-storagebox.de]:23 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIICf9svRenC/PLKIL9nk6K/pxQgoiFC41wTNvoIncOxs
---
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: CronJob
metadata:
name: authentik-backup
namespace: authentik
spec:
schedule: "15 3 * * *"
concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 3
failedJobsHistoryLimit: 3
jobTemplate:
spec:
backoffLimit: 2
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik-backup
app.kubernetes.io/component: backup
spec:
restartPolicy: OnFailure
containers:
- name: backup
image: rohana.axion1337.de/sorb/axion-backup:v2
env:
- name: BORG_REPO
value: "ssh://u641795@u641795.your-storagebox.de:23/./authentik-backup"
- name: BORG_PASSPHRASE
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: authentik-backup-credentials
key: borg-passphrase
- name: SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE
value: /secrets/ssh/ssh-private-key
- name: SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_FILE
value: /secrets/known-hosts/known_hosts
- name: DB_HOSTS
value: "authentik:authentik-postgresql"
- name: PGUSER
value: authentik
- name: PGPASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: authentik-credentials
key: pg-password
volumeMounts:
- name: ssh-key
mountPath: /secrets/ssh
readOnly: true
- name: known-hosts
mountPath: /secrets/known-hosts
readOnly: true
- name: scratch
mountPath: /scratch
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 128Mi
limits:
memory: 256Mi
volumes:
- name: ssh-key
secret:
secretName: authentik-backup-credentials
items:
- key: ssh-private-key
path: ssh-private-key
mode: 0400
- name: known-hosts
configMap:
name: authentik-backup-known-hosts
- name: scratch
emptyDir: {}
+55
View File
@@ -226,3 +226,58 @@ data:
domain: authentik-default
attrs:
default_application: !Find [authentik_core.application, [slug, matrix]]
matrix-oidc-provider.yaml: |
# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://goauthentik.io/blueprints/schema.json
version: 1
metadata:
name: matrix-oidc-provider
labels:
blueprints.goauthentik.io/instantiate: "true"
entries:
# The OIDC Provider + Application linking Authentik to MAS was originally
# clicked together by hand in the UI and existed nowhere as code (issue
# #36): losing the Authentik DB would have meant re-creating this from
# scratch, including a new client_secret that MAS would then no longer
# match. client_secret is read from AUTHENTIK_MAS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
# (see authentik.yaml HelmRelease values) rather than inlined here,
# since this ConfigMap itself is not SOPS-encrypted - the actual value
# lives in the authentik-credentials Secret instead.
- model: authentik_providers_oauth2.oauth2provider
state: present
identifiers:
name: Matrix Authentication Service
id: matrix_mas_provider
attrs:
client_type: confidential
client_id: dHbTAgAgXvjh3VALh220mB3dxcVXAifiXU2ZO3U6
client_secret: !Env AUTHENTIK_MAS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
# Path includes MAS's own upstream-provider ID, not Authentik's -
# must match MAS's config exactly or the OIDC callback breaks.
redirect_uris:
- matching_mode: strict
url: https://account.axion1337.chat/upstream/callback/01KQDJTR1ZVTG8JQ220F5BNBFZ
# Stable across username renames - this is what keeps
# upstream_oauth_links rows valid after e.g. the elbojoloco rename.
sub_mode: hashed_user_id
include_claims_in_id_token: true
access_code_validity: minutes=1
access_token_validity: minutes=5
signing_key: !Find [authentik_crypto.certificatekeypair, [name, "authentik Self-signed Certificate"]]
authorization_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent]]
invalidation_flow: !Find [authentik_flows.flow, [slug, default-provider-invalidation-flow]]
property_mappings:
- !Find [authentik_core.propertymapping, [managed, "goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-openid"]]
- !Find [authentik_core.propertymapping, [managed, "goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-email"]]
- !Find [authentik_core.propertymapping, [managed, "goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-profile"]]
- model: authentik_core.application
state: present
identifiers:
slug: matrix
attrs:
name: aXion1337.chat Accountverwaltung
provider: !KeyOf matrix_mas_provider
meta_description: Matrixclient tailored for aXionCommunity
meta_publisher: aXionGaming
policy_engine_mode: any
open_in_new_tab: false
+5 -4
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ stringData:
secret_key: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:yIyQapbFtFM11LynFtkV3ffExhaDfN9QHeFbI1T0xkIhgsV+9sjg3qwMVmeBlAe7xZl8gsAM4kDj2Q6O91OdDg==,iv:+Cl8vOcxG9/mgRheaCO0bLWyCJXN+f1F2DD3oeHbPFY=,tag:711ytyKf6/tmXomBLoffGA==,type:str]
pg-password: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:3w8R9mRjMXMJDLjrC8QYaXFHsCU3yYZs2PcaFQNp3Z4=,iv:G/aXgoGz3vBOzZ5K3Y+DDJsqer4F5gvcMmtkzRx93CU=,tag:dXPs1pY/APvnMlxdvB1EkA==,type:str]
smtp-password: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:JpMgaQFPkBzOg5WjvpmhM0kPwvZkH+4tQjT17RJHjG14WjmWtfG9Bg==,iv:zjQRLIlrxKv5hbd4JZowNUEiibiCUMf79acZY0+dYAc=,tag:ORPafTPyOQJvVvHWQGmqhA==,type:str]
mas-oidc-client-secret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:0yx55FroLSxlnuYgfNwczu3PnbPm1kW74JtiU9oFevVqeQDZc385wU6x5X5TN7owXDO7QaOfGTTMvqIpbwQb6Q5Vt1VMToR+0f44oJcktYoTiDFU9Sy6lR/y6nlvBCNqeJg7vIyVpkIqxwqty15EekyqMpkIMp1fT6Pxmek0SO0=,iv:Ey06ljnqbVARDLVt2sLe8R776VEWpTlzI/+Nka5NocA=,tag:I+GNLHz4V8TFa2ijzK5y2Q==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- recipient: age14l0hwfqylwpemz5y2ghh2yxk0phszlnj3qlejhue0fw0kz3tmfgqdsjzdh
enc: |
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBRekJuZythYzliTFJ3RlhS
R2p6TG9NeFdabFlPRWtpNHJMYVVxTWZEcmlRClk0WUorSzdxNlcyWHYwWFBTMnlq
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ sops:
QXVrY1NTeHZkeTlPRWNlVThzWno3T0kKC0KBoLT64GNqb8Ri9u69G7nqb1KftwwP
/24aVHrPxKi9d4ij9n3bvCYDF4rhtfexhrE4n7CfuKn2DcSiuTniuw==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
lastmodified: "2026-04-29T21:43:59Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Y+dJppkaVZ5NOhlvwbbsF5+vDFqGUI1Ps8IcE4J7FIW4HIdMVf6RKM0EInvPUW1LaBlmelCitcE30w0As7ysNRhLY8yUDaKUvuU6mRejlNUIF8wAHzhciL2jTvAQsArHjybJatEig28+wM9VcY8JEa/d/CmuiB9Nq4WbIV+JXlA=,iv:UQj2rIVLNPjtYp3d/jRyNfJyyyUsZ3+NDCgpI4aztzc=,tag:cwiCzG/A+rfRFfLjXVt82w==,type:str]
recipient: age14l0hwfqylwpemz5y2ghh2yxk0phszlnj3qlejhue0fw0kz3tmfgqdsjzdh
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-07-28T15:54:53Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:P6IF+jukwzldK92nHl6s4h6sS4ldXLwpyLpwv2tpI3vFWgTLEnGCnowi2k5lmWUlITEVmLLC0HvsBuduTiGI2sIHHt+r3RdqkV88HGn6oYDVq5a+Ax7ESfqti/4B7ClQCSxl/tU6hBUFe812DiBXJgA03UJQZn8uHY/dP/RgRpc=,iv:V8sqhbJcKglkKsQmJBdgoxDaCYJ3Wt/qRa18jEviH60=,tag:EiNotrYAKIzKndgjU/kTFQ==,type:str]
version: 3.12.2
Executable → Regular
+14
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,15 @@ spec:
global:
security:
allowInsecureImages: true
# Read by the matrix-oidc-provider blueprint via !Env, so the OAuth2
# Provider's client_secret can be captured as code without ever
# inlining the live credential into a plain (non-SOPS) ConfigMap.
env:
- name: AUTHENTIK_MAS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: authentik-credentials
key: mas-oidc-client-secret
authentik:
log_level: info
@@ -89,3 +98,8 @@ spec:
memory: 256Mi
limits:
memory: 512Mi
# Chart's own generated policy allows ANY pod in ANY namespace on 5432
# (see issue #37) - disabled in favor of our own scoped policy in
# apps/authentik/networkpolicy.yaml.
networkPolicy:
enabled: false
+3
View File
@@ -9,3 +9,6 @@ resources:
- authentik.yaml
- ingress.yaml
- networkpolicy.yaml
# Backup zur Hetzner Storage Box (Issues #6 + #15)
- authentik-backup-secret.yaml
- authentik-backup.yaml
+33 -3
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@
# for upstream OIDC calls. Egress is intentionally untouched (federation-equivalent
# outbound calls like SMTP aren't restricted here).
#
# Note: authentik-postgresql already has its own NetworkPolicy from the Bitnami
# postgresql subchart (port 5432, no source restriction) - left alone, not duplicated,
# since it would get reset on the next Helm upgrade anyway.
# authentik-postgresql: the Bitnami postgresql subchart's own generated NetworkPolicy
# restricted the port (5432) but not the source - any pod in any namespace could reach
# it (issue #37). Disabled via postgresql.primary.networkPolicy.enabled: false in
# authentik.yaml and replaced below with a policy scoped to authentik-server/-worker.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
@@ -47,6 +48,35 @@ spec:
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-authentik-postgresql
namespace: authentik
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: postgresql
app.kubernetes.io/component: primary
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik
app.kubernetes.io/component: worker
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik-backup
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5432
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-acme-solver
namespace: authentik
BIN
View File
Binary file not shown.
+19 -10
View File
@@ -4,19 +4,28 @@ metadata:
name: coturn-secret
namespace: matrix
stringData:
TURN_SECRET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:SILIqMB+fmAMFITAL7lG1hOgICec6BJf1mOcK0gdmnCHWYqRuJv7jgjfGylG25xzQKi+zE7Qual9PnkZG2KiOA==,iv:+GZqLGusE4Q0x2jEEtFxj06rryyQmQhXdkTy4eE8ZHw=,tag:OpSZkinPTAi1ZKWyo8OX3A==,type:str]
TURN_SECRET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:gab4MSNlRANQz/T/Xn0Z45tkUvQ3Uxn5u0MyYfhZTan49P865UbX4rYPf/KmKsekdwFdOGBzvCgcwxhddVbZ1w==,iv:INbz5UUxgA6xdsPBp5W9Mwe+kd9dhHh2Rx5l3yeNRIQ=,tag:dgk/iFjvst7Wul9Lai2QEQ==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- recipient: age14l0hwfqylwpemz5y2ghh2yxk0phszlnj3qlejhue0fw0kz3tmfgqdsjzdh
enc: |
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSAyRk1mK3NWc1l4T0JCOFpF
S0RuQ3ViZmo3QTNVL2JvZ0hzMy91R2l0TEhzCk01a1VGdk1sdVg4aWswTzRibXI4
ZlJtNFF5MjBONEZOaWVpeU5taHl2bkEKLS0tIGxpUHY3NUFLWFBaWm1QSlZiVFkx
MEJleHFnd3oyT3VPL2dsYkpMUlRkOWMKcKUIgsQ/ff49pGGXMnYwJmwqPVC7woAR
IEzvhcNX97xx746SnrxZe5t2YadsYMkYIl0nvqBPJhSlvqMNafpQbQ==
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBQMncxOEhRZC9jcHpjT3dW
Q1RNaW5pc00zVnJhWHRnZHd3TGhURWNZU2dJCk85bXJkbTEyd1ZybjhDT05pL2c3
ZU9EUSt1eDlSQWJyVGtsak1oS3FSR2sKLS0tIEFUdXVHL0V1ZW5VMVVBZEJaYUIw
U1BrYlJyQVZkZFhBdmdwbDMyK3lTQkkKEaSy1o+IICf2uaT6olapRJa/duXxjOBg
OqRS9axnJ71XxEnHjLTsCbkI5b+8Fux08qKaH9sMsJrWOiSHDdTXXQ==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
lastmodified: "2026-04-29T21:06:21Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:UhyR5m1HYWrZHwNLW5sg2PxbpaydWbP5cekghGlzSpQg7CYEcvZw3tJ/qB8zA19xZSM7tdSHOXdD+QytRq6qW59M1unqMaumA43B6JxQg1C1NdXAW0mkSc2WiNchvgpVii9P/TVlzSSIRwC3YGCQUsfa3SSfNzI4Z6fMuBnhYLE=,iv:4HYxbrYSRJLe1KcQ6q8bpee8/Lx1m3pPmisb/L2Mu64=,tag:l7n3u+Pg6533OzwtNUZvNw==,type:str]
recipient: age14l0hwfqylwpemz5y2ghh2yxk0phszlnj3qlejhue0fw0kz3tmfgqdsjzdh
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSAwQk82eGdWRmdRNFJQR0xF
SWhNRUtNWThZNFM0aXU3V0N4UkhtTy9NTFdnCi9pa3dsVXRja1dTL1pZTnoxQ0JT
UUIxekZnVGUvdFgyblFiS0JLMjU3L2cKLS0tIE1IRTJ0M3kvMFZPWVVDYjJlVkk0
eGJQOTVUc1NsNE5GdmJtODlmdHp3c2cKHTP6YRMTdYE/iBuSZs/Tjt4TwKCxHEIu
f3jTblKIqWwRHKCgOIkC16QDbpMBlNLH3JknJEdIjkB2HIrXrw1MNA==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1x4jjwc8nuttwr8us924pvdc6dll5npkc6c8f4zf2hx5d2qu75dtqx0fm0d
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-07-28T19:26:57Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:zU3i1WGY1X4igBYzfC1WAWdtMQZWGBSacaJpXnUVt6+BCfucqaH807IRWpWbTR0+xuLteaqcdXuVuAlStqs/VV586Q4cD2FfWDeBq/O09HEwTrfekTjAyyu7zCFyZ2ja+kB4DQ83NoscCiNwNmfTZF+6RzMqx7yphPxK5go1r7c=,iv:6FIYWsNvz78zJscbxyDgy1u6ur20MnOMkMcsA4329OI=,tag:uSDpAWEixGcVmtOloMoKuw==,type:str]
version: 3.12.2
Executable → Regular
+15
View File
@@ -65,6 +65,17 @@ metadata:
namespace: matrix
spec:
replicas: 1
# hostNetwork pods bind directly to the node's ports (3478/5349) - on this single-node
# cluster, RollingUpdate's default "bring up the new pod before removing the old one"
# can never schedule (port conflict). Recreate kills the old pod first.
# Note: switching to Recreate on an existing Deployment that already had the
# RollingUpdate defaults recorded required a one-time manual
# `kubectl patch --type=merge -p '{"spec":{"strategy":{"rollingUpdate":null,"type":"Recreate"}}}'`
# (2026-07-28) - a YAML `rollingUpdate: null` in this file is dropped before reaching the
# API server (client-side omits null keys) rather than sent as an explicit field deletion,
# so it can't clear an already-set field on its own.
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app: coturn
@@ -74,6 +85,10 @@ spec:
app: coturn
annotations:
prometheus.io/scrape: "false"
# Bumped on every TURN_SECRET rotation (Issue #38) to force a new pod, since
# Kubernetes doesn't restart running pods when a referenced Secret's content
# changes and the initContainer that reads it only runs once at pod start.
rotated-at: "2026-07-28T19:26:57Z"
spec:
hostNetwork: true
dnsPolicy: ClusterFirstWithHostNet
@@ -58,15 +58,6 @@ data:
room_list_publication_rules:
- user_id: "*"
action: allow
turn:
config: |
turn_uris:
- "turn:turn.axion1337.chat?transport=udp"
- "turn:turn.axion1337.chat?transport=tcp"
- "turns:turn.axion1337.chat?transport=tcp"
turn_shared_secret: "cab3c8408363515d9b4cdc3384a1f76ca17a973242fdfdc72b67ac4d86158527"
turn_user_lifetime: 86400000
turn_allow_guests: false
oembed:
config: |
oembed_enabled: true
+8 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,11 @@ metadata:
name: matrix-stack
namespace: matrix
spec:
interval: 5m
# Shortened from 5m to match production-apps Kustomization's 1m interval - narrows the
# window between coturn (Kustomization-only, no Helm indirection) and synapse-main
# (behind this HelmRelease) picking up a rotated TURN secret after Issue #38's
# automated-rotation PR gets merged. Self-heals either way, just faster now.
interval: 1m
chart:
spec:
chart: matrix-stack
@@ -25,6 +29,9 @@ spec:
- kind: Secret
name: ess-mas-values-secret
valuesKey: values.yaml
- kind: Secret
name: synapse-turn-secret
valuesKey: values.yaml
values:
# Top-Level: serverName das ist dein Matrix-Homeserver-Name
View File
View File
+14 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
# Patch: Fügt einen Checksum der element-values.yaml zur HelmRelease hinzu
# Damit wird Flux die HelmRelease neu-synced wenn sich die ConfigMap ändert
# Patch: Fügt Checksums der element-values.yaml und des turn_shared_secret zur
# HelmRelease hinzu. Damit wird Flux die HelmRelease neu-synced (und synapse-main neu
# gestartet), wenn sich die jeweilige ConfigMap/Secret ändert - siehe Issue #38's
# Rotations-Mechanismus, der turn-secret-checksum bei jeder Rotation bumpt.
patches:
- target:
kind: HelmRelease
@@ -12,6 +14,9 @@ patches:
- op: add
path: /metadata/annotations/element-config-checksum
value: "401f8a87d0ef5d91d2e5032d4aede42c"
- op: add
path: /metadata/annotations/turn-secret-checksum
value: "d220c0e4ff8f7106328c8827d47e8734"
resources:
- matrix-postgres-auth.yaml
@@ -26,8 +31,15 @@ resources:
# TURN Server für WebRTC
- coturn-secret.yaml
- coturn.yaml
- synapse-turn-secret.yaml
# HelmRelease (muss ganz unten stehen, damit die ConfigMaps vorher da sind!)
- element-server-suite.yaml
# Custom Apex Ingress für Element Web + Well-Known auf axion1337.chat
- apex-ingress.yaml # Custom Apex Ingress für Element Web + Well-Known auf axion1337.chat
- networkpolicy.yaml
# Backup zur Hetzner Storage Box (Issues #6 + #15)
- synapse-backup-secret.yaml
- synapse-backup.yaml
# Automatisierte TURN-Secret-Rotation (Issue #38)
- turn-secret-rotation-secret.yaml
- turn-secret-rotation.yaml
+3
View File
@@ -258,6 +258,9 @@ spec:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matrix-authentication-service
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse-backup
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5432
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: synapse-backup-credentials
namespace: matrix
stringData:
borg-passphrase: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:RRXPwr4UGX30IdozM53abN7ZYztTO3Y1/63dtTh0JSZmU8i8l/ATb4gc3lc=,iv:rIyUr+lOUjo9J53OKZ5ZDmp3d8Nrb9PP2JDK2oCutYU=,tag:MqUmoYgCA03WJQy+RQi04w==,type:str]
ssh-private-key: ENC[AES256_GCM,data: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,iv:sKGsTLsxdQYVUvw7CEARL3YNInSd9LPbFp5Ci5CTgIw=,tag:O1mjNZUsGEqV4uu+LlgD/g==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSB3ZUdtN3hyNHlyMkIrbTVS
aHQ4OGNUWnA4eTFUVkx4UVp5VWlnMDgxTEU0CkU3M2dMYWgyKytlRVFOVWptZEd2
NXlIY0JCd24xcGFzaGpIeks0R2U0U3MKLS0tIHlxYVZ1ZTJsRXNaZ25sVzZtSnp0
SEhzQ0tUYzZTRXcwMVNwbG85SHpyb0UKOn3nxy6Y7yQkGargXQ9z6O36vUWW4qJZ
D/GbFGmoRi94EtVFdmTGALhjy2D4J9QXy6gHsTapvKyMxF8NEtk+FQ==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age14l0hwfqylwpemz5y2ghh2yxk0phszlnj3qlejhue0fw0kz3tmfgqdsjzdh
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-07-28T18:20:58Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Rur32fQdCyM3nr/X+KeSgmPYEi4nKyh8lqTuSW3TPBVDjwTWMDp1I1ZPPyy5syeW6RHbKputFUzBWVnuQmVrfbZaQ6DBBI5kP9InspUAVUjXDRk9XqiWtdg/wYaTMMJ4Nxv/zdwkh6uJQSG2JHQBWce4NZc2hoPokLR0CjcWiZk=,iv:eWTUj48EFjjtuIIuErMltEdDfabLZeolkpInMYtVP5Q=,tag:6DPxkPqLt0ihJ80WnTzHeA==,type:str]
version: 3.13.3
+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
# Nightly Borg backup of the shared Postgres instance (synapse + MAS databases) and the
# Synapse media_store PVC to a Hetzner Storage Box (issues #6 + #15). See
# apps/production/synapse-backup-secret.yaml for the SSH key + Borg repo passphrase, and
# apps/authentik/authentik-backup.yaml for the equivalent authentik-side job.
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: synapse-backup-known-hosts
namespace: matrix
data:
# Pinned via `ssh-keyscan -p 23 u641795.your-storagebox.de` (2026-07-28) rather than
# trusting the host key on first connect in an unattended job.
known_hosts: |
[u641795.your-storagebox.de]:23 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIICf9svRenC/PLKIL9nk6K/pxQgoiFC41wTNvoIncOxs
---
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: CronJob
metadata:
name: synapse-backup
namespace: matrix
spec:
schedule: "0 3 * * *"
concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 3
failedJobsHistoryLimit: 3
jobTemplate:
spec:
backoffLimit: 2
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse-backup
app.kubernetes.io/component: backup
spec:
restartPolicy: OnFailure
containers:
- name: backup
image: rohana.axion1337.de/sorb/axion-backup:v2
env:
- name: BORG_REPO
value: "ssh://u641795@u641795.your-storagebox.de:23/./synapse-backup"
- name: BORG_PASSPHRASE
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: synapse-backup-credentials
key: borg-passphrase
- name: SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE
value: /secrets/ssh/ssh-private-key
- name: SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_FILE
value: /secrets/known-hosts/known_hosts
- name: DB_HOSTS
value: "synapse:matrix-stack-postgres matrixauthenticationservice:matrix-stack-postgres"
- name: PGUSER
value: postgres
- name: PGPASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: matrix-stack-generated
key: POSTGRES_ADMIN_PASSWORD
- name: MEDIA_PATH
value: /media/media_store
volumeMounts:
- name: ssh-key
mountPath: /secrets/ssh
readOnly: true
- name: known-hosts
mountPath: /secrets/known-hosts
readOnly: true
- name: media
mountPath: /media
readOnly: true
- name: scratch
mountPath: /scratch
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 128Mi
limits:
memory: 256Mi
volumes:
- name: ssh-key
secret:
secretName: synapse-backup-credentials
items:
- key: ssh-private-key
path: ssh-private-key
mode: 0400
- name: known-hosts
configMap:
name: synapse-backup-known-hosts
- name: media
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: matrix-stack-synapse-media
readOnly: true
- name: scratch
emptyDir: {}
+31
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: synapse-turn-secret
namespace: matrix
stringData:
values.yaml: ENC[AES256_GCM,data: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,iv:bPK1+PViBg046N3q2Eb1ZOJOYv7X/HgpCEU/MLp7o6k=,tag:/2Kyv7aB4baOL+3KdAeQ9w==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBuK2xIT3M0cGtVOHdKYklF
OHl1VHFRTkVSaHVQNUUyRlhZUjRWM3JUN0hBCnpUS2YzdG1mSjlRaEVvTHdKVkR4
L1hrR05IRUdqdGp2aU95aWxRRXdsQWcKLS0tICtLbnFsK3Zza053VXFWdVErRy92
WUUzZTBIRzUyWnp5a1ZScUVqb0NyencKvnFyJCR6j1/aH4gJvFmLPNlk5XpC08wF
mTmL981uGfz4NULc+O3sDkonJ827glpefgWPgPW2HmKT88d4A9vyJw==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age14l0hwfqylwpemz5y2ghh2yxk0phszlnj3qlejhue0fw0kz3tmfgqdsjzdh
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBVY0NXa1B5c2RzbzRReU1h
RHBSbk9aK3d6VjRWZ1hzL3FDZFZJZGFqTVQ0Ck9ib0p3bkR6cU8yc0VFNjEzSFFi
T3dWY1luQW1VZ1NjZFNoZFFLSCsvelkKLS0tIHIxV0d6TWhpSEc3d3c0L1VvOWxk
eDhTM2pDbTNXZXlWRVYxR2tPQU5iLzgKrLLLSBU/g5ebeRNi7hWYbcuJ/2JOfiUn
0DBnzMVJPBfqq/u8THiRYaMajx3k4D9+FN7qc5nBgTd85iGBo+OowA==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1x4jjwc8nuttwr8us924pvdc6dll5npkc6c8f4zf2hx5d2qu75dtqx0fm0d
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-07-28T19:26:57Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:UfD+QJel9FygoKPM02KdOLvP1id/21ghQ0uWAQJxEs/w+B2vVkpe/dXSJ7QnI0e528ns1HW81GAxkxyAupsUDq8/pBdEQgItwDs5DIgHvH+sTPAtj2Kyq2wMOeEt+XDGLRdOlAwbcKDS/LyfeZ5b9QnAbY2w/tTinTkzEvbudT8=,iv:WmmwjAmZmM0W8dvqBcv9XYZkYtan3lg0Sb8ypVuGoJk=,tag:3yzZhSFtbSbLUXSdDWGAtw==,type:str]
version: 3.13.3
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: turn-secret-rotation-credentials
namespace: matrix
stringData:
age-key.txt: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:4LAs9LLFo38UMHXCo4lun9RHxGnDyp7GWlaNdIqqkSL9lNv7+ILdlc03CxFVobCYxK65xMOn1xdEty+887JBMlawST04am/5MkAnUivKwXCw8OHmbZhCwKHFqSYH/NsgVNf+btZKIIny8XPVQAPj/vQIi+Ity+BQyPkEZ1WUcsqjDoaK9IFhQTePJtHgWivhOY2WpUt/TP7vTfub4TOrgVpzNd9LIpBkwq+zhpVXKwnYUWOuLMXlPe08kazy,iv:9A24HbTl24slj+qTCfyI01+dGqRFVPDUA0wp2kSUHpc=,tag:iQxU0dWD4Noo1m0HXhV6vQ==,type:str]
gitea-token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:cmZ1GCrqRYLtLn+cRVZCrO7UcCIavlQLJPt2PRMtBbgLdhDVTElUKA==,iv:9v29GXHRtDlrL3PoRCdOqYpBepZrX04+6UjoywRZX0E=,tag:ZvYXBOm9qgB1XA5lkV4LsQ==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSA5S3BtTHNLVGVVM2ZpTlZS
Y3pGMS9CSkNsdUpPbWtkSTRHK0p6U2lwdEJnClVWdXp4SllyM1hvbTZyTU40SDc2
QlVtMDduZWpaVENiYnhMNlFXd01QblEKLS0tIGNzTGRZcmoyaFltUHRDSHBPZE1N
OCszUkl1VjQ5V3F2cVI4dXJFcER5YXcK+2Eh1JNLuMiCnpQ3cL/I7XTykkIZ3tqp
O3c9UwYs1FAZWlMgElTBTqsmut1ShduIYfDFRKGeS0UxPEM4U+tIGw==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age14l0hwfqylwpemz5y2ghh2yxk0phszlnj3qlejhue0fw0kz3tmfgqdsjzdh
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-07-28T19:21:28Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:vx6Bs/L0NXKUvvQdu6aYtuur/CYPkIBZzvFLqTyd08Errw0dGMrg73oHQ/imxpe42HgnO2mGwxNdEx2jYYbtc3RBWHE/yPH5m8y/XLoSL3fauzbkGsDwMSWzKiZXyIuGh7SxuB+CFY9qqFMK+dap1Ofno7a1/Gr1qibVDqscwxw=,iv:9AUQQuTCja09OohzVw73URMHE8xCW7iLLtBg7GSDcPA=,tag:g1ibnBIGqokvs2IEVOYq6Q==,type:str]
version: 3.13.3
+70
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
# Automated TURN shared-secret rotation (Issue #38). Generates a new secret, re-encrypts
# apps/production/coturn-secret.yaml and synapse-turn-secret.yaml using a dedicated,
# narrowly-scoped age key (see turn-secret-rotation-secret.yaml - it can only decrypt these
# two files, not the repo's master sops-age key), bumps the checksum/rotated-at annotations
# so a merge restarts both consumers automatically, and opens a Pull Request rather than
# pushing straight to main - a human reviews and merges it.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: CronJob
metadata:
name: turn-secret-rotation
namespace: matrix
spec:
schedule: "0 4 1 * *"
concurrencyPolicy: Forbid
successfulJobsHistoryLimit: 3
failedJobsHistoryLimit: 3
jobTemplate:
spec:
backoffLimit: 1
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: turn-secret-rotation
app.kubernetes.io/component: rotation
spec:
restartPolicy: OnFailure
# Public-internet reachability to the Gitea host has been flaky (see Issue #41);
# both servers share a private Hetzner network. hostAliases (unlike the node-level
# /etc/hosts fix used for image pulls) is actually honored by in-pod processes.
hostAliases:
- ip: "10.0.0.3"
hostnames:
- "rohana.axion1337.de"
containers:
- name: rotate
image: rohana.axion1337.de/sorb/axion-secret-rotation:v1
env:
- name: GITEA_HOST
value: "rohana.axion1337.de"
- name: GITEA_REPO
value: "sorb/axion1337.chat-gitops"
- name: GITEA_TOKEN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: turn-secret-rotation-credentials
key: gitea-token
- name: SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE
value: /secrets/age/age-key.txt
- name: GIT_AUTHOR_NAME
value: "turn-secret-rotation"
- name: GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL
value: "turn-secret-rotation@axion1337.chat"
volumeMounts:
- name: age-key
mountPath: /secrets/age
readOnly: true
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 64Mi
limits:
memory: 128Mi
volumes:
- name: age-key
secret:
secretName: turn-secret-rotation-credentials
items:
- key: age-key.txt
path: age-key.txt
mode: 0400
BIN
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BIN
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Executable → Regular
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+27
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@@ -104,3 +104,30 @@ ist reines Zurückkopieren, kein Neu-Erzeugen).
zurückgeholt hat. Es gibt kein separates, offsite Backup. Fällt der Server komplett aus
(nicht nur der lokale Rechner), sind alle SOPS-verschlüsselten Secrets im Repo unlesbar.
Siehe Issue-Backlog für die Entscheidung, ob/wie das abgesichert wird.
---
## 🌐 Node-Konfiguration: `/etc/hosts`-Eintrag für den Gitea-Host
Der K3s-Node und der Gitea-Host (`rohana.axion1337.de`, Container-Registry + Git-Remote)
teilen sich ein privates Hetzner-Netzwerk (Node `10.0.0.2`, Gitea-Host `10.0.0.3`). Seit
2026-07-28 hat der Node dafür einen manuellen `/etc/hosts`-Eintrag:
```
10.0.0.3 rohana.axion1337.de
```
**Warum**: eine Firewall-Fehlkonfiguration hatte den Node zeitweise komplett von
`rohana.axion1337.de` über die öffentliche IP abgeschnitten, was Image-Pulls (z.B. für
Custom-Images wie `sorb/axion-backup`) mit Timeout scheitern ließ. Der Eintrag macht
Image-Pulls unabhängig vom Zustand der öffentlichen Firewall.
**Wichtig**: Das ist unmanaged Node-Konfiguration (kein GitOps, kein Kubernetes-Objekt) —
überlebt einen Node-Neuaufbau **nicht** und muss dann erneut gesetzt werden:
```bash
echo "10.0.0.3 rohana.axion1337.de" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
```
Ein sauberer, clusterweiter Ersatz (z.B. CoreDNS-Rewrite, damit auch Pods selbst intern
auflösen) ist als Issue #41 nachgehalten.
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Executable → Regular
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