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Thore CimbalandClaude Opus 5 e7469a36b8 feat(netpol): deny pods the metadata service, leave everything else open (#0088)
First egress rule in matrix, authentik and monitoring. It allows DNS, the cluster
ranges and the whole internet, and denies only 169.254.0.0/16 - link-local, where
Hetzner serves instance metadata unauthenticated to any pod.

Deliberately narrow. The textbook cut, 0.0.0.0/0 except RFC1918, would have severed
two things here, both over 10.0.0.3 on the private Hetzner network: Alloy writes
metrics and logs there, and the TURN rotation reaches Gitea through a hostAlias to
that address. Private ranges therefore stay open.

The payoff is modest and should be stated as such: measured from a pod, the service
answers with instance-id, hostname, region, MAC and network config, while userdata
and public-keys are empty. No credentials are exposed here, unlike the AWS case this
hardening usually targets. It costs nothing though, and it closes the class.

Two preconditions checked rather than assumed, because both are the usual way this
breaks: kube-system carries kubernetes.io/metadata.name so the DNS rule actually
matches, and the cluster is IPv4-only so 0.0.0.0/0 really does cover everything.

Rollback is deleting the one policy per namespace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 12:00:00 +00:00

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# Default-deny ingress for the authentik namespace, with explicit allow rules for the
# traffic paths that actually need to reach in: Traefik (kube-system) for the public
# auth.axion1337.chat endpoint and ACME HTTP-01 challenges, and MAS (matrix namespace)
# for upstream OIDC calls. Egress is intentionally untouched (federation-equivalent
# outbound calls like SMTP aren't restricted here).
#
# authentik-postgresql: the Bitnami postgresql subchart's own generated NetworkPolicy
# restricted the port (5432) but not the source - any pod in any namespace could reach
# it (issue #37). Disabled via postgresql.primary.networkPolicy.enabled: false in
# authentik.yaml and replaced below with a policy scoped to authentik-server/-worker.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
namespace: authentik
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-authentik-server
namespace: authentik
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: matrix
ports:
# NetworkPolicy matches the pod's actual container port, not the Service's
# external port - the authentik-server Service maps 80->9000, 443->9443.
- protocol: TCP
port: 9000
- protocol: TCP
port: 9443
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-authentik-postgresql
namespace: authentik
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: postgresql
app.kubernetes.io/component: primary
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik
app.kubernetes.io/component: worker
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik-backup
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5432
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-acme-solver
namespace: authentik
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
acme.cert-manager.io/http01-solver: "true"
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8089
---
# Egress: alles bleibt erlaubt AUSSER dem Metadaten-Dienst (management #0088).
#
# Warum so schmal? Der Lehrbuch-Schnitt (0.0.0.0/0 except RFC1918) haette hier zwei
# Dinge zerrissen, beide ueber 10.0.0.3 (CFGMON im privaten Hetzner-Netz): Alloy
# schreibt Metriken und Logs dorthin, und der TURN-Rotations-CronJob erreicht Gitea
# ueber einen hostAlias auf dieselbe Adresse. Private Netze bleiben deshalb offen.
#
# 169.254.0.0/16 ist Link-Local; darin liegt bei Hetzner unter 169.254.169.254 der
# Metadaten-Dienst, aus jedem Pod unauthentifiziert abfragbar (nachgemessen 2026-08-19:
# HTTP 200 mit instance-id, hostname, region, MAC, Netzkonfiguration). userdata und
# public-keys waren LEER - es liegen hier also keine Zugangsdaten offen. Der Gewinn ist
# entsprechend bescheiden; der Schnitt kostet aber nichts und schliesst die Klasse.
#
# ACHTUNG beim Erweitern: Sobald eine Egress-Regel fuer einen Pod existiert, gilt fuer
# ihn Default-Deny fuer alles NICHT Aufgefuehrte. Die drei Bloecke unten sind daher
# Pflicht, nicht Bequemlichkeit - insbesondere DNS: fehlt es, steht alles, und der
# Fehler sieht wie ein Anwendungsproblem aus, nicht wie eine Firewall.
#
# Rollback: diese eine Policy im Namespace loeschen.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: egress-block-metadata
namespace: authentik
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
# 1. DNS - zuerst, weil ohne DNS nichts geht.
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
# 2. Cluster-intern: Pods und Services (inkl. API-Server 10.43.0.1).
- to:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.42.0.0/16
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.43.0.0/16
# 3. Alles uebrige - Foederation, ACME, SMTP, Registries, privates Netz -
# ausser Link-Local.
- to:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
except:
- 169.254.0.0/16