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axion1337.chat-gitops/apps/production/networkpolicy.yaml
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# Default-deny ingress for the matrix namespace, with explicit allow rules per component.
# Egress is intentionally untouched (federation to arbitrary Matrix servers, ACME, SMTP,
# DNS all stay unrestricted).
#
# Lesson learned deploying the authentik namespace's equivalent policy: NetworkPolicy
# filters on the pod's actual container port, not the Service's external port (e.g.
# authentik-server's Service maps 80->9000). Wherever a Service here uses a *named*
# targetPort, this file references that name directly instead of guessing a number -
# Kubernetes resolves it from the pod spec, which is safer than a hardcoded port.
#
# matrix-stack-postgres already effectively has no dedicated chart NetworkPolicy of its
# own (unlike authentik-postgresql's Bitnami one) - the rules below are the only gate.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
---
# axion1337.chat (root) -> Element Web
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-element-web
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: element-web
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: element
---
# admin.axion1337.chat -> Element Admin
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-element-admin
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: element-admin
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: http
---
# axion1337.chat/docs/setup -> Element desktop setup docs (our own nginx)
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-element-web-docs
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: element-web-docs
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
---
# matrix.axion1337.chat AND the well-known delegation both front through haproxy
# (matrix-stack-synapse and matrix-stack-well-known Services both target haproxy's
# named ports, not synapse-main directly).
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-haproxy
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: haproxy
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: haproxy-synapse
- protocol: TCP
port: haproxy-403
- protocol: TCP
port: haproxy-wkd
# Draupnir (Issue #18) calls Synapse's client-server API directly, in-namespace -
# without this it would be silently blocked by the default-deny policy.
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: draupnir
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: haproxy-synapse
# Client-Scan-Dienst (Issue #19-Erweiterung) validiert Access-Tokens gegen Synapses
# eigenen /whoami-Endpoint statt eine eigene Auth zu bauen.
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: clamav-http-scanner
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: haproxy-synapse
---
# account.axion1337.chat (Traefik) + matrix.axion1337.chat (also routes to MAS for some
# paths) + synapse-main calling MAS's internal port for session/token introspection.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-mas
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matrix-authentication-service
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse-main
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse-main
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8081
---
# Synapse itself: reached via haproxy (same namespace), calls from MAS (provisioning),
# metrics scraped by Alloy (monitoring namespace).
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-synapse
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse-main
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: haproxy
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matrix-authentication-service
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: synapse-http
- protocol: TCP
port: synapse-health
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: monitoring
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: synapse-metrics
---
# mrtc.axion1337.chat (Traefik) for the auth handshake, plus Alloy scraping metrics.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-rtc-authorisation-service
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matrix-rtc-authorisation-service
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matrix-rtc-sfu
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: http
---
# The SFU: mrtc.axion1337.chat (Traefik) for signalling, Alloy for metrics, and the
# NodePort-exposed WebRTC media ports need to stay open to the internet by design -
# that's the actual point of a TURN/SFU media relay, not a mistake.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-rtc-sfu
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matrix-rtc-sfu
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: http
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: monitoring
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: metrics
- from:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 30001
- protocol: UDP
port: 30002
---
# Postgres: only Synapse and MAS need data access; Alloy scrapes the exporter.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-postgres
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: postgres
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse-main
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: matrix-authentication-service
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse-backup
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5432
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: monitoring
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 9187
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-acme-solver
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
acme.cert-manager.io/http01-solver: "true"
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8089
# Note: coturn runs with hostNetwork: true, so NetworkPolicy does not apply to it at all -
# it's already gated by the Hetzner Cloud Firewall instead. Nothing to write here.
---
# ClamAV (Issue #19): only Synapse's check_media_file_for_spam module calls this, over
# clamd's plain TCP protocol on port 3310. Nothing else needs to reach it.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-clamav
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: clamav
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: synapse-main
# Client-seitiger Scan-Dienst (Issue #19-Erweiterung) braucht denselben ClamAV.
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: clamav-http-scanner
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: clamd
---
# axion1337.chat/_scan (Traefik) - client-seitiger Scan-Dienst, direkt vom Browser aufgerufen.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-clamav-http-scanner
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: clamav-http-scanner
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: http
---
# wiki.axion1337.chat (Traefik) -> Wiki.js (ADR-0014, #0048)
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-wikijs
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wikijs
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wikijs-config # Konfig-Job darf Wiki.js erreichen
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: http
---
# Wiki.js -> sein eigener Postgres (nur von Wiki.js-Pods erreichbar)
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-ingress-wikijs-postgres
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wikijs-postgres
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wikijs
# Nächtliches Backup (wikijs-postgres-backup.yaml) braucht denselben DB-Zugang.
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wikijs-backup
# Tägliche Gruppenprüfung (wikijs-gruppenpruefung.yaml, #0103) liest nur.
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: wikijs-gruppenpruefung
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: postgres
---
# Egress: alles bleibt erlaubt AUSSER dem Metadaten-Dienst (management #0088).
#
# Warum so schmal? Der Lehrbuch-Schnitt (0.0.0.0/0 except RFC1918) haette hier zwei
# Dinge zerrissen, beide ueber 10.0.0.3 (CFGMON im privaten Hetzner-Netz): Alloy
# schreibt Metriken und Logs dorthin, und der TURN-Rotations-CronJob erreicht Gitea
# ueber einen hostAlias auf dieselbe Adresse. Private Netze bleiben deshalb offen.
#
# 169.254.0.0/16 ist Link-Local; darin liegt bei Hetzner unter 169.254.169.254 der
# Metadaten-Dienst, aus jedem Pod unauthentifiziert abfragbar (nachgemessen 2026-08-19:
# HTTP 200 mit instance-id, hostname, region, MAC, Netzkonfiguration). userdata und
# public-keys waren LEER - es liegen hier also keine Zugangsdaten offen. Der Gewinn ist
# entsprechend bescheiden; der Schnitt kostet aber nichts und schliesst die Klasse.
#
# ACHTUNG beim Erweitern: Sobald eine Egress-Regel fuer einen Pod existiert, gilt fuer
# ihn Default-Deny fuer alles NICHT Aufgefuehrte. Die drei Bloecke unten sind daher
# Pflicht, nicht Bequemlichkeit - insbesondere DNS: fehlt es, steht alles, und der
# Fehler sieht wie ein Anwendungsproblem aus, nicht wie eine Firewall.
#
# Rollback: diese eine Policy im Namespace loeschen.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: egress-block-metadata
namespace: matrix
spec:
# Waehlt alle Pods AUSSER denen, die gar keinen Ausgang brauchen (#0088).
#
# ⚠️ Der Ausschluss muss HIER stehen, nicht in einer zusaetzlichen engen Policy:
# NetworkPolicies sind additiv. Solange diese Policy 0.0.0.0/0 fuer einen Pod
# erlaubt, aendert eine zweite, strengere Regel fuer denselben Pod nichts.
#
# `NotIn` waehlt auch Pods, die das Label gar nicht tragen - am 2026-08-20 im
# Cluster nachgemessen (29 Pods, 1 Treffer, notin liefert 28). Drei Pods im
# Namespace fuehren kein app.kubernetes.io/name, deshalb der zweite Ausdruck
# auf `app`. Beide Ausdruecke sind UND-verknuepft.
podSelector:
matchExpressions:
- key: app.kubernetes.io/name
operator: NotIn
values:
- element-web
- element-admin
- postgres
- wikijs-postgres
- clamav-http-scanner
- wikijs-gruppenpruefung
- haproxy
- draupnir
# Welle 1 (#0088): kein externer Bedarf nachweisbar.
- matrix-rtc-authorisation-service
- wikijs-config
- init-secrets
- synapse-check-config
- deployment-markers-pre
- deployment-markers-post
- key: app
operator: NotIn
values:
- element-web-docs
- concierge-bot
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
# 1. DNS - zuerst, weil ohne DNS nichts geht.
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
# 2. Cluster-intern: Pods und Services (inkl. API-Server 10.43.0.1).
- to:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.42.0.0/16
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.43.0.0/16
# 3. Alles uebrige - Foederation, ACME, SMTP, Registries, privates Netz -
# ausser Link-Local.
- to:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
except:
- 169.254.0.0/16
---
# Pods ohne jeden Bedarf an Ausgang nach draussen (#0088).
#
# Zehn Arbeitslasten sprechen ausschliesslich cluster-intern: die drei nginx-Dienste,
# beide Postgres, der ClamAV-Vorschalter, haproxy, die Wiki-Gruppenpruefung und die
# beiden Matrix-Bots (Foederation ist geschlossen, Draupnir holt keine fremden
# Policy-Listen). Fuer sie faellt der pauschale 0.0.0.0/0-Satz weg; erlaubt bleibt
# DNS und das Cluster-Netz.
#
# Zwei Policies, weil ein podSelector nicht ueber zwei Label-Schluessel odern kann -
# die Vereinigung mehrerer Policies leistet genau das.
#
# Rollback: beide Policies loeschen und den Ausschluss in egress-block-metadata
# zuruecknehmen.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: egress-nur-intern
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchExpressions:
- key: app.kubernetes.io/name
operator: In
values:
- element-web
- element-admin
- postgres
- wikijs-postgres
- clamav-http-scanner
- wikijs-gruppenpruefung
- haproxy
- draupnir
# Welle 1 (#0088): Deploy- und Hilfs-Arbeitslasten.
- matrix-rtc-authorisation-service
- wikijs-config
- init-secrets
- synapse-check-config
- deployment-markers-pre
- deployment-markers-post
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
- to:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.42.0.0/16
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.43.0.0/16
---
# Dieselben Regeln fuer die zwei Pods, die kein app.kubernetes.io/name fuehren.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: egress-nur-intern-app-label
namespace: matrix
spec:
podSelector:
matchExpressions:
- key: app
operator: In
values:
- element-web-docs
- concierge-bot
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
- to:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.42.0.0/16
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.43.0.0/16