sorb tested a group call after the restart and it works. That proves what curl could
not: the full OpenID token check through /_matrix/federation/v1/openid/userinfo still
completes with federation closed, so the whitelist genuinely does not reach that
endpoint.
It is also where option C finally died. Blocking /_matrix/federation at the edge would
have removed exactly this path, and nothing before the call would have shown it.
sorb chose C, fully disabling federation at the edge. Building it showed that would
have killed group calls: lk-jwt-service verifies OpenID tokens through
/_matrix/federation/v1/openid/userinfo and reaches it over the public name, so a path
block on /_matrix/federation is the mrtc outage again with a different cause. C was
dropped and B implemented.
The ADR records the measurement the decision rests on - zero destinations, zero remote
users, zero rooms with outside participation in four months - and the trap, so nobody
completes C later as a quick follow-up. Doing that safely means binding the auth
service to Synapse in-cluster first, which is its own undertaking with a call
acceptance.
Also recorded because it nearly slipped through: Flux applied the ConfigMap while
Synapse kept running its old config from 2026-08-01. The config is rendered at pod
start, so the change was inert until a restart - the same class as #0044. Verified
afterwards inside the running process rather than in the ConfigMap, with the client
API and the OpenID endpoint still answering.
The question sat open since July because nobody knew what closing would cost. It is
now measured: zero. No destinations, no remote users, no rooms with outside
participation, across four months of operation - while the federation API answers
HTTP 200 from the public internet, since the well-known delegation routes federation
over 443 and port 8448 being shut changes nothing.
So the trade is not reach against safety but an unused capability against Synapse's
largest remote-facing surface. Recommended B, an empty federation_domain_whitelist:
one line, versioned, reversible in minutes, and honest about what it does not do -
the endpoints keep answering, so the server becomes unengaged rather than invisible.
Decision remains sorb's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ADR-0012 made docs/issues/ canonical for the management scope only and left
gitops, ThreadNet-Web and threadnet-call on GitLab "until the component adopts".
That split produced exactly what it invited: two numbering worlds where
management#20 and gitops#20 are different issues, drift nobody had to answer for
(gitops#61 carried no milestone since 2026-08-11), and component backlogs that
host sessions without lab access cannot read at all.
The 46 open component issues are now files 0056-0101. The file id is the
group-wide identifier; provenance lives in the frontmatter (new field `projekt`
plus gitlab_iid) and in the filename, so "gitops#61" still finds 0091. Bodies are
copied verbatim; comments and history stay on GitLab, as with the 2026-08-11
management import.
Both scripts learned the second dimension: spiegel_issues.py routes each file to
its origin project, reopens issues that are open in the repo but closed on the
board, and writes the new iid back after creating one; gruppenpruefung.py checks
drift across all four trackers instead of management alone. What the mirror
cannot decide stays a finding, not a silent state.
Two things needed a hand, both recorded in the files: gitops#61 had no milestone
(M1 - it is a live account-takeover path) and carried two area labels where the
schema holds one. The Gitea migration footers in the imported bodies point at
decommissioned trackers; their links are removed, the provenance sentence stays.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Thore Cimbal
